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revises his old beliefs on his environment into new ones with the currently stored perceived
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manner. In this setting, we consider three kinds of belief changes, e-expansion, e-contraction
and e-revision. We prove the Levi identity by these changes considering the perceived
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1. Introduction
1.1. Revision of beliefs: Methodology and Motivations. This paper presents
a revision process of a player’s personal view on his social environment. In our the-
ory, a player has initial beliefs on the environment. With the beliefs, he confronts the
environment repetitively and stores information for some time as his perceived expe-
riences. Finally he revises his initial beliefs according to the perceived experiences
and derives his personal view on the environment. By the investigation, we describe
an inductive derivation process of a player’s personal view from his experiences.
Keneko and Kline [12, 13] (hereafter the KK theory) have recently been devel-
oping a new theory of info-memory protocols. Our theory employs Kaneko-Kline’s
framework as our basic context. The KK theory introduces players’ memory func-
tions and derives their various personal views according to the memory functions.
We make use of the memory functions for the accumulation of information to derive
their perceived experiences. While the KK theory shows a player’s coherent per-
sonal view for his memory function, we show the revision process of the personal
view based on the perceived experiences.
The situation we target is depicted in Figure 1, as formally stated in Section 3
and 4. We suppose that a player with initial beliefs B = ⟨B,CB⟩ encounters an
environment repetitively. Here we call B his basic beliefs and CB a causality set of
the basic beliefs. Given his memory function, he obtains the perceived experiences
E = ⟨E,C(E)⟩, which consists of his basic experiences E and the causality set of
the basic experiences C(E) in the same mathematical manner as the beliefs. In
the revision process, the player revises his old beliefs B in light of his perceived
experiences E and obtains the new beliefs B′.
For the revision of a player’s beliefs, we consider three types of belief changes:
e-contraction, e-expansion, and e-revision. By the e-contraction, a player elimi-
nates a part of beliefs which he initially held but has not experienced. It means
B = ⟨B,CB⟩
New Beliefs
B′ = ⟨B′, CB′⟩
Perceived Experiences
E = ⟨E,C(E)⟩
e-expansion
e-contraction
e-revision
Belief Changes
Old Beliefs
Figure 1. Revision Process
2
46
Annual Research Bulletin of Osaka Sangyo University
that his beliefs are not supported without his experiences. The e-expansion is to
add some beliefs to reflect perceived experiences. These two belief changes are set-
theoretically monotonous. However, the changes of our beliefs are not necessarily
monotonous. We call the non-monotonous change according to the perceived expe-
riences e-revision.
Our concept of e-revision is based on the Pareto principle: If an option O is no
worse than an alternative O′ in all dimensions of interest and better than O′ in some,
a player should prefer O. The revision concept based on the Pareto principle has
been introduced by Schulte [18]. Our first result is to characterize the revision based
on the Pareto principle by the e-contraction and e-expansion, which is called Levi
identity in belief revision theory.1 After showing this Levi identity as a benchmark
of the e-revision, we will present some variations of the identity.
1.2. Motivating example. Plato [17] gave an analogy of the cave for explanation
of the role of education. Our concept of the perceived experiences is similar to that
of the habituation in the analogy. We explain the perceive experiences as compared
with the habituation. And then we exemplify a brief description of our theory on
the analogy.
The analogy of the cave can be summarized as follows: Prisoners have been
confined in a cave from their birth, and they have been chained in such a way that
all they can see is the back wall of the cave. On this wall, they can see shadows
projected from the outside world. These shadows are the only real view of the world
for them. Each prisoner constructs the own view of the world based on his memories
and interpretations of the shadows.
We now consider the situation based on this analogy in Kaneko and Kline [12, 13].
Suppose that a prisoner observes the shadows every morning and every evening at a
certain time. When the morning comes, a H orse and a Cart always pass in turn, and
the evening comes as depicted in Figure 2.2 To the prisoner who does not distinguish
between the shadows, the world appears as in Figure 3, which shows four possible
interpretations of two shadows passing by. Then how does he recognize the further
situation? Plato continues the analogy as follows:
Then there would be need of habituation, I take it, to enable him to
see the things higher up. And at first he would most easily discern
the shadows and, ...... later, the things themselves, and from these
he would go on to contemplate the appearance... (Plato [17, p. 748])
1Ga¨rdenfors [4] provides the comprehensive account of belief revision theory.
2Each italic letter in the previous sentence means each symbol in the figures. E.g., ‘morning
represents m in the figures.
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m  H  C  e
Figure 2. Objective World
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Figure 3. Personal View
The prisoner begins to notice the appearance of the shadows with the habituation.
The perceived experiences are part of the habituation. Indeed, a player accumulates
his information and observation as his perceived experiences. Such experiences will
be got from a part of the habituation by further repetition.
Our theory expresses the situation that a player notices the appearance of the
shadows as follows. Suppose that he notices that a horse ﬁrst comes as his perceived
experiences, i.e., he does not notice what comes second. Then his personal view
would be changed as Figure 4. Namely, he would rule out the possibility that the
ﬁrst shadow of the day is a cart, and would reconstruct a new view that the ﬁrst
is a horse. In this paper, we propose a theory in which this process is broken down
into several basic characteristic properties.
The reader may recall literature of learning models such as Fudenberg and Levine [3]
and Kalai and Lehrer [8]. While those models permit a player to have a diﬀerent
view about his opponents’ behaviors, our theory focuses on a construction of a per-
sonal view on a game itself. Moreover, Gilboa and Schmeidler [6] propose the other
theory in which a player decides his behavior based on his past cases (the case-based
decision theory). Unlike their case-based reasoning, our theory concentrates on the
formation process of a personal view. The player of our theory decides his action
after recognizing the environment he is facing now.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces the info-memory
protocols following the KK theory. In this section we also provide a player’s experi-
ence constructed from his memories. Section 3 introduces a framework of revision in
info-memory protocols. In Section 4, we present the fundamental revision structure
with experience, e-contraction, e-contraction, and the experience-based consistent
revision (e-revision). We also show the Levi identity in info-memory protocols. Sec-
tion 5 investigates the construction of a personal view from the revision and discusses
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Figure 4. Revised Subjective View
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the relation between the objective world and subjective views. Last section states
the literatures of revision theory and gives comments on the further research.
2. Basic Context: An Info-memory Protocol
This section formalizes the info-memory protocols following Kaneko and Kline [12,
13]. The KK theory distinguishes between an objective world and subjective views.
Both the objective world and subjective views are formulated in the info-memory
protocols. In this section, we give a general framework of an info-memory protocol
without any distinction between objective use and subjective use. After that, we
define only the objective info-memory protocols. The subjective use of the protocols
will be derived through the revision process in Section 5.
2.1. Information protocols and Basic axioms. Let W be a nonempty finite
set of information pieces, A be a nonempty finite set of actions, and ≺ be a finite
subset of
∪∞
m=0((W ×A)m ×W ). Then an information protocol is given as a triple
Π = (W,A,≺).
The relation ≺ is called a causality relation. Whenm = 0, we regard (W×A)0×W
asW . Then≺ is a unary relation onW . Each element ⟨(w1, a1), . . . , (wm, am), w⟩ ∈≺
is called a feasible sequence. We also write [(w1, a1), . . . , (wm, am)] ≺ w for its fea-
sible sequence. ⟨ξ, w⟩ denotes a generic element of ∪∞m=0((W ×A)m ×W ), and ⟨w⟩
is that of (W ×A)0 ×W , which is denoted by ≺ w.
Based on a causal relation ≺, we give a partition on W . Let WD be a set
of decision pieces; WD := {w ∈ W | [(w, a)] ≺ v for some a ∈ A and v ∈ W}.
WE := W \WD is called a set of end pieces.
Now let N = {0, 1, . . . , n} be the set of players to an information protocol Π.
Player 0 is called the chance player and players 1, . . . , n are called personal players.
Then we provide a player assignment as a function pi : W → 2N that pi(w) assigns
a single player for any w ∈WD and {1, . . . , n} for any w ∈WE . Some single player
is assigned for each decision piece and all the personal players are assigned for any
end piece. We denote the set {w ∈ W | i ∈ pi(w)} as Wi, which is the set of player
i’s decision pieces and all the end pieces.
For a distinction between an objective description and a construction of a sub-
jective view, Kaneko and Kline introduce the following four basic axioms and two
non-basic axioms.
Axiom B1 (All Pieces used): For any w ∈W , ≺ w.
Axiom B2 (All Actions used): For any a ∈ A, there are some u, v ∈ W
such that [(u, a)] ≺ v.
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Give a sequence [(w1, a1), . . ., (wk, ak)], we define a subsequence by regarding each
(wt, at) as a component of the sequence to preserve the order. Also, we say that
⟨(w1, a1), . . . , (wk, ak), wk+1⟩ is a subsequence of ⟨(v1, b1), . . . , (vm, bm), vm+1⟩ if and
only if either [(w1, a1), . . . , (wk, ak), (wk+1, a)] is a subsequence of [(v1, b1), . . . , (vm, bm)]
for some a or [(w1, a1), . . . , (wk, ak)] is a subsequence of [(v1, b1), . . . , (vm, bm)] and
wk+1 = vm+1. A supersequence is defined likewise.
Axiom B3 (Contraction): Let ⟨ξ, v⟩ be a feasible sequence and ⟨ξ′, v′⟩ any
subsequence of ⟨ξ, v⟩. Then ⟨ξ′, v′⟩ is a feasible sequence.
Axiom B4 (Weak Extension): If ξ ≺ w and w ∈ WD, then there are some
a ∈ A and v ∈ W such that [ξ, (w, a)] ≺ v.
Note that ξ′ might be empty in Axiom B3. Then we regard ⟨v′⟩ as a feasible sequence
if v′ occurs in ⟨ξ, v⟩. Axiom B4 guarantees that a player can choose some action at
each of his decision pieces.
When an information protocol satisfies the above four axioms, we call it a basic
information protocol. Kaneko and Kline require two other non-basic axioms to be
matched with classical extensive games. The basic axioms with non-basic axioms
enable a complete description of an objective situation. We need to introduce more
notations here to show these axioms:
• A feasible sequence ⟨ξ, v⟩ is maximal if there is no proper feasible superse-
quence of ⟨ξ, v⟩;
• ⟨(w1, a1), . . . , (wk, ak), wk+1⟩ for k = 1, . . . ,m or ⟨w1⟩ is called an initial
fragment of ⟨(w1, a1), . . . , (wm, am), wm+1⟩;
• A position ⟨ξ, v⟩ is an initial fragment of some maximal feasible sequence.
We denote the set of all positions by Ξ.
In order to represent an objective situation, we show two non-basic axioms.
Axiom N1 (Extension): If ⟨ξ, v⟩ is a position and [(v, a)] ≺ u, then there is
a w ∈ W such that ⟨ξ, (v, a), w⟩ is a position.
Axiom N2 (Determination): Let ⟨ξ, v⟩ and ⟨ζ, w⟩ be two positions. Then
ξ = ζ implies v = w.
Note that N1 with B3 implies B4 (Lemma 2.4 in [12, p. 14]). Kaneko and Kline [12]
show the equivalence between an extensive game in Kuhn [15] and an information
protocol satisfying Axioms B1-B3, and N1-N2.
For an information protocol Π = (W,A,≺), we write Πo = (W o, Ao,≺o) for an
objective information protocol.
Example 2.1. We consider another variation of the ‘analogy of the cave’ in the
Introduction. Now suppose that the shadows in a day depends on the weather
6
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depicted in Figure 5. In this objective world, two H orses pass in a sunny day and
two Cart pass in a rainy day and then the evening comes. Here, p represents the
nature’s action that time passes.
Then the objective information protocol Πo = (W o, Ao,≺o) is represented as
follows: W o = {m,H,C, e} where W oE = {e} (i.e., e is the unique end piece in
this protocol), Ao = {s, r, p}, and ≺o is all subthreads of the maximal sequences
⟨(m, s), (H, p), (H, p), e⟩ and ⟨(m, r), (C, p), (C, p), e⟩. Then this objective informa-
tion protocol satisfies both the basic axioms and non-basic axioms.
Nevertheless, consider the personal view depicted in Figure 3 in this objective
world by regarding each arrow as the nature’s action p. For two positions ⟨(m, p), (C, p), C⟩
and ⟨(m, p), (C, p), H⟩ (or ⟨(m, p), (H, p), C⟩ and ⟨(m, p), (H, p), H⟩), Axiom N2 is
violated. This is because [(m, p), (C, p)] ([(m, p), (H, p)], respectively) does not im-
ply the same information piece. In this case, Axiom B2 is also violated because s, r
are not used.
Furthermore look at Figures 6 and 7. While Figure 6 violates both Axioms B4
and N1, Figure 7 satisfies B4 but violates N1. Because, for a position ⟨(m, r), C⟩
and the feasible sequence (C, p) ≺ e, ⟨(m, r), (C, p), e⟩ is not a position. Nevertheless
⟨(m, r), C⟩ forms another feasible sequence ⟨(m, r), (C, p), H⟩. That is, Axiom B4
gives successive feasible sequences and Axiom N1 guarantees that a root is uniquely
determined.
2.2. Memory functions and Accumulation of memories. We introduce play-
ers’ memory functions which gives a part of histories that every player knows at
each of his decision pieces. Each of them accumulates his own memories and
keeps them as his basic experiences. Consider an objective information protocol
Πo = (W o, Ao,≺o), which is not assumed to satisfy any particular axioms.
A memory of a player consists of recognized information pieces and actions in the
past. We call the pair a memory thread. Let Av(⊆ A) be a set of available actions
at v ∈W , then a memory thread is a finite feasible sequence
µ = ⟨(v1, b1), . . . , (vm, , bm), vm+1⟩
where, for all t = 1, . . . ,m, vt ∈ W , bt ∈ Avt and vm+1 ∈ W . Note that the KK
theory gives a memory thread with feasible action set at each information piece. Our
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Figure 5. Objective World
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Figure 7. Violation of
only N1
theory does not need the feasible action set and omits the set (cf. p. 10 in Kaneko
and Kline [13]).
Each component (vt, bt) or vm+1 in µ is called a memory knot for the distinction
of feasible sequences. The ending memory knot vm+1 of µ is denoted by ϵ(µ) and is
called the tail of µ.
Let Ξi be a subset of Ξ such that {⟨ξ, w⟩ ∈ Ξ | i ∈ π(w)}, i.e., player i’s positions.
Then a memory function is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2. A function mi is called a memory function of player i if and only if,
for each position ⟨ξ, w⟩ ∈ Ξi, mi⟨ξ, w⟩ is a finite non-empty set of memory threads
satisfying i ∈ π(ϵ(µ)) for all µ ∈ mi⟨ξ, w⟩.
A memory function mi stipulates that any information pieces at any tails in mi
belong to the set of i’s information pieces. The memory function of player i takes i’s
all perceptions of the objective world, i.e., each player recognizes an objective world
only through his memory function.
Now we give a basic framework for an objective world and players’ recognition of
it. An objective info-memory protocol is a triple (Πo, πo,mo) with a set of players
N = {1, . . . , n} satisfying Axioms B1-B3, and N1-N2, which consists of:
• an objective information protocol Πo = (W o, Ao,≺o);
• an objective player assignment πo : W o → 2N ;
• objective memory functions mo = (mo1, . . . ,mon).
The objective info-memory protocol provides a framework to describe the sit-
uation that the players repetitively play in a mutual situation. Each of them is
supposed to accumulate memory threads through his memory function as defined
below:
Definition 2.3. For Ξ ⊆ Ξoi , T (moi ; Ξ) is i’s accumulation set of his memory threads
defined as follows:
T (moi ; Ξ) =
∪
⟨ξ,w⟩∈Ξ
moi ⟨ξ, w⟩. (1)
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Since we deﬁne a memory thread without feasible action sets unlike the KK theory,
the above accumulation does not have action sets. Therefore we do not need the
operation which eliminates the action sets as the KK theory does.
In contrast to the KK theory, the union range Ξ in (1) is not necessarily equal to
Ξoi . A player does not perceive all the occurrence over his positions as his experience.
That is, our theory is allowed the partial accumulation of his memory threads unlike
the request of the perfect accumulation of the KK theory.3 We do not discuss how
the union range is decided. The decision may be related with a player’s emotion,
mentality, character, and so on. However, for the focus on the revision process, this
paper concentrates on the accumulation of memory threads given Ξ
In order to compare a player’s accumulations of memory threads with the feasible
sequences in an information protocol, we need the following operation to obtain the
subsequence-closed set. This operation helps the construction of a personal view
discussed in Section 5.
Definition 2.4 (Basic Experience). Given Ξ ⊆ Ξoi , i’s basic experience Ei(Ξ) (or
simply Ei) is the subsequence-closed set of memory threads as follows:
Ei(Ξ) = T
∗(moi ; Ξ), (2)
where T ∗(moi ; Ξ) be the set of all subsequences of every sequence in T (m
o
i ; Ξ).
In the next section, we give the fundamental structure of a player’s beliefs and
experiences by using the above basic experience. Before proceeding the next section,
we look at an example to understand the accumulations of memory threads and the
operations.
Example 2.5. Recall the objective information protocol given in Example 2.1. For
the objective information protocol with the set of player N = {i}, we give the
objective player assignment as pio(w) = {i} for any w ∈W o.
Now let us suppose that he is aware of the diﬀerence of weather by the habituation:
He ﬁnds two horses to come in a sunny day and two carts in a rainy day. In this paper,
we do not discuss how the habituation is formed but consider how the habituation
has an eﬀect on personal views. Here we look at the eﬀect of the habituation.
3See Kaneko and Kline [13, p. 11].
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Consider the following memory function:
moi ⟨ξ, w⟩ =

{⟨m⟩} if w = m
{⟨(m, s), H⟩} if ξ = (m, s)
{⟨(m, r), C⟩} if ξ = (m, r)
{⟨(m, s), (H, p), H⟩} if ξ = [(m, s), (H, p)]
{⟨(m, r), (C, p), C⟩} if ξ = [(m, r), (C, p)]{
⟨(m, s), (H, p), (H, p), e⟩,
⟨(m, r), (C, p), (C, p), e⟩
}
if w = e.
Player i recognizes the diﬀerence of weather under this memory function. If we
suppose the perfect accumulation like the KK theory, the player completely accu-
mulates all the above memory threads. In contrast, our theory investigates various
habituations. For instance, if he focuses on a sunny day, i.e., Ξ = {⟨m⟩, ⟨(m, s), H⟩,
⟨(m, s), (H, p), H⟩}, he accumulates
T (moi ; Ξ) =
{
⟨m⟩, ⟨(m, s), H⟩,
⟨(m, s), (H, p), H⟩
}
.
and
T ∗(moi ; Ξ) =
{
⟨m⟩, ⟨H⟩, ⟨(m, s), H⟩, ⟨(H, p), H⟩,
⟨(m, s), (H, p), H⟩
}
.
This basic experience could break Axiom A4.
3. Event-causality Structure in the Info-memory Protocol
This section provides a fundamental structure of beliefs as the event-causality
structure. A player’s belief and experience are represented on the event-causality
structure, as the belief structure and the perceive experience structure, respectively.
For the deﬁnition of the structure, we introduce objective expressions in the next
subsection. By making use of this expression, we give semantics for the player’s
belief and experiences. That is, we put in a context each sequence of information
protocol that the player has in mind.
3.1. Objective expressions. For a representation of players’ beliefs, we consider a
ﬁxed set of objective expressions, denoted by L. Objective expressions are combina-
tion of ﬁnite sequences in ∪∞m=0((W o×Ao)m×W o) of a ﬁxed objective information
protocol Πo := (W o, Ao,≺o). Formally, L consists of A, N(A), and P (A) deﬁned
as follows:
(1) A := ∪∞m=0((W o ×Ao)m ×W o);
(2) N(A) := {¬s | s ∈ A};
(3) P (A) := {s t | s, t ∈ A}.
10
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The set A gives any finite sequence representable by the given objective infor-
mation protocol. We call each member in A an atomic objective expression. N(A)
gives a negation of each finite sequence in A. We regard ¬s for s ∈N(A) as s ∈ A.
Therefore, while we can consider that the negation ¬ is infinitely used, the expres-
sion is restricted in two kinds, s,¬s for each s ∈ A. We represent by ¬s that s does
not occur. For an atomic objective expression s, we refer s as the positive expression
and ¬s as the negative expression. Then we denote the positive expression of s in
A ∪N(A) as s+.
The possibility connective  represents a possibility that something may happen
following a predecessor. That is, s  t (s leads to t) means that, if s occurs, then
t may occur. If a player has a belief s  r, then he believes that r may occur if s
occurs.
In order to restrict the use of the possible connective to the relation between a
supersequence and a subsequence, we set P¯ (A) = {s+  t+ ∈ P (A) | For s, t ∈
A ∪ N(A), s+ is a subsequence of t+}. Then L¯ ⊂ L consists of A, N(A), and
P¯ (A).
The possibility connective may remind the reader of a modal concept in the modal
logic or possible worlds in Kripke’s semantics. Indeed, if a player has a belief, s r,
he believes the possibility r whenever he observes s. Nevertheless, he can change
the possibility through the revision. That is, he refines several possibilities that he
hold through the revision with his experiences. Unlike the modal logic, this paper
looks at the revision process to refine the possibilities that a player holds.
We define semantics of each objective expression logically derived from other
objective expressions. Consider the two-valued set {⊤,⊥} of beliefs. Then a player’s
belief assignment σ of the set A is a function σ : A → {⊤,⊥}. We extend the
assignment σ of a player to the function σ¯ : L¯ → {⊤,⊥} by the following types on
the length of an objective expression:
• For any s ∈ A, σ¯(s) = ⊤ if and only if σ(s) = ⊤;
• σ¯(¬s) = ⊤ if and only if σ¯(s) = ⊥;
• σ¯(s t) = ⊤ if and only if σ¯(s) = ⊥ or σ¯(t) = ⊤.
We interpret the above assignments as that he believes the expression to happen
if a player assigns ⊤ to an objective expression and as that he does not believe it if
he assigned ⊥.
3.2. Beliefs and Perceived Experiences. The sequences in an info-memory pro-
tocol have been connected by the objective expressions above. As the next step, we
give a player’s beliefs and experiences in the objective expressions. For a finite subset
11
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F1, F2 ⊆ A∪N(A), let C(F1;F2) be the causality set between F1 and F2 deﬁned as
C(F1;F2) =
{
s+  t+ ∈ P¯ (A) | s ∈ F1, t ∈ F2
}
. Then we deﬁne the fundamental
structure, the event-causality structure, with the causality set as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Event-Causality Structure). For a ﬁnite subset F1, F2 ⊆ A∪N(A),
the event-causality structure is deﬁned by a pair of ⟨F1, C(F1;F2)⟩, where F1 is called
a basic event, F2 is a conceivable event, and C(F1;F2) is called the causality set
between F1, and F2.
The event-causality structure provides the propositions based on the sequences
and the relations among those propositions. Indeed, given F1, F2 ⊆ A ∪ N(A),
C(F1;F2) means the connections between two sequences as a causal relation ≺ in
an information protocol does.
We introduce a player’s beliefs and perceived experiences by the event-causality
structure as follows:
Beliefs: The event causality structure B = ⟨B,CB⟩ is called a player’s beliefs
if the positive expressions in B are subsequence-closed and there is a set B′
with B′ ⊇ B such that CB := C(B;B′). Then we call B the basic beliefs,
and CB a causality of B.
Perceived Experiences: The event causality structure E = ⟨E,C(E)⟩ is
called the perceived experiences if E = E(Ξ) as Deﬁnition 2.44 and C(E) :=
C(E;E). Then we call E a player’s basic experiences and C(E) the causality
of E.
While both the beliefs and the perceived experiences are deﬁned on the event-
causality structure, there is a diﬀerence between these two structures. First of all,
while the conceivable event in the perceived experiences is the same E as the basic
experiences, that of the beliefs is given as a set with B′ ⊇ B. This means that he
can recognize the relations in B also have some misunderstandings due to B′ ⊇ B.
A player also reﬁnes such misunderstandings through the revision.
Second, while the basic belief in the beliefs is represented by both the atomic
objective expressions and the negation of them, the basic experience in the perceived
experiences does not have any negation. This is because of the construction by a
player’s memory function (Recall Deﬁnition 2.4). However it does not mean that the
player has no new negation through the revision. The acquisition of new negation in
his belief is involved in the causality set and the consequences as deﬁned below. In
the following two sections, we investigate such revision process and the properties
of it.
4A player’s index i is abbreviated
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In the repetitive process as Figure 1, a player inductively considers the basic events
as the basic beliefs and basic experiences and derives the causality from the basic
beliefs and experiences. Then the beliefs are revised with referring the perceived
experiences and construct his personal view on his environment.
4. Revision of Beliefs with Perceived Experiences
So far we have provided some basic notions for the revision of a player’s be-
liefs. By introduction of the objective expressions, we can represent the sequences
in the info-memory protocols and give the event-causality structure for the beliefs
and experiences. This section shows the belief change from B to the new belief B′
according to E as in Figure 1. We introduce the contraction and expansion with
the perceived experiences, called e-contraction and e-expansion, respectively. After
that, we presents the fundamental axioms for the revision with the perceived expe-
riences as the experience-based consistent revision (or e-revision) and characterize
the revision by the e-contraction and e-expansion.
4.1. E-contraction and E-expansion. In the standard belief revision theory,
there are three types of belief changes:
• A contraction is to eliminate some propositions without adding any propo-
sition;
• An expansion is to add new propositions to the old belief without retracting
any element of the old belief;
• A revision is to eliminate some propositions and to add new propositions in
order to avoid contradictions in the new beliefs.
A contraction can be made when a player observes the proposition that contra-
dicts what he previously believed. An expansion is commonly the result of new
observations that a player has never watched. A revision is a change to avoid some
contradictions by new observation but is not such monotonous changes as the con-
traction and expansion.
A common property of both a contraction and an expansion is set-theoretically
monotonous. This is because each change rejects a new proposition if it is inconsis-
tent with the propositions held initially. Nevertheless a player sometimes faces the
situation where he gives up some proposition in the old belief and accepts another
new proposition in the new belief. For instance, it is the occasion that he observes
something unexpected or surprising. The revision can be made when he accepts the
propositions inconsistent with the old beliefs without any inconsistency.
13
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We apply these three changes to the revision with the perceived experiences.
As deﬁned before, the perceived experiences are not just an observation but the
accumulation of the repetitive observations based on his memory function. A player
changes his belief in the light of the accumulation.
We introduce the consequence set Cn:
Definition 4.1 (Consequence of Beliefs). Let B = ⟨B,CB⟩ be a player’s beliefs.
The consequence set Cn of B is deﬁned as follows:
Cn(B) =
{
v ∈ L¯
����� σ¯(v) = ⊤ for any σ¯ with σ¯(u) = ⊤for all u ∈ B ∪ CB.
}
.
This consequence set is the set of the believable propositions that a player induces
from his belief structure. For instance, if the player believes {p, p  q}, then the
consequence set guarantees that he induces {q}. Therefore he has two kinds of
reasoning (i) the causality of his basic event set by the causality set and (ii) the
consequence of his belief structure by the consequence set.
Now we deﬁne two set-theoretical operations for the event-causality structures:
For the two event-causality structures F1 = ⟨F1, C(F1;F ′1)⟩, F2 = ⟨F2, C(F2;F ′2)⟩,
F1 ⊆ F2 is F1 ⊆ F2 and C(F1;F ′1) ⊆ C(F2;F ′2). In addition, let Ec be the structure
⟨B \E,C(B ∩E;B \E)⟩ for a player’s beliefs B = ⟨B,CB⟩ and the perceived expe-
riences E = ⟨E,C(E)⟩. We represent by Ec what a player initially believed but did
not experience. Indeed, the basic event B \E is the set of sequences that he initially
held but did not have. And the causality C(B∩E;B\E) is the objective expressions
using the possibility connective that he did not have the causality even though he
experienced the sequences he initially held. Since we take the diﬀerence between B
and E, the causality is a diﬀerent from that of the event causality structure.
Now we deﬁne an e-contraction with the consequence set of beliefs:
Definition 4.2 (E-contraction). Let B = ⟨B,CB⟩ and B′ = ⟨B′, CB′⟩ be two be-
liefs of a player, and E = ⟨E,C(E)⟩ his perceived experiences. Then B′ is an
e-contraction from B with E if and only if
(C1) B′ ⊆ B;
(C2) Ec ∩ Cn(B′) = ∅;
(C3) there is no other belief structure B′′ = ⟨B′′, CB′′⟩ such that Ec∩Cn(B′′) = ∅
and (B ∪ CB) \ (B′′ ∪ CB′′) ⊊ (B ∪ CB) \ (B′ ∪ CB′),
where Ec = (B \ E) ∪ C(B ∩ E;B \ E).
This deﬁnition is a modiﬁed version of Schulte’s retraction-minimal contraction
(See Schulte [18, p. 346]). In his paper, Schulte proposes the revision principle
14
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based on the Pareto principle stated in Introduction. Indeed (C3) is based on this
requirement, i.e., the change of beliefs should be minimized.
While (C1) is a natural condition to be a contraction, (C2) reflects our idea of the
e-contraction. By definition, Ec is the set of the propositions that he initially held
but did not experience. Therefore (C2) requires that, if a player does not have any
experiences of the beliefs initially held, then he neither believes nor reasons them.
We refer each member of Ec as a non-experienced proposition.
In general, a contraction in not decided uniquely. This is because there are usually
several alternatives to contract when facing experiences inconsistent with his beliefs.
For example, suppose that he believes {¬q, p  q} and his experience {p}. Then
he might change his belief to either {p,¬q}, {p, p  q}, or {p}. Nevertheless, it is
uniquely determined in our theory because of the separation of the basic event and
the causality.
Proposition 4.3. Let B = ⟨B,CB⟩, B′ = ⟨B′, CB′⟩ be two belief structure and
E = ⟨E,C(E)⟩ be the perceived experiences. Then B′ is the e-contraction from B
with E if and only if
⟨B′, CB′⟩ = ⟨B ∩ E,CB \ C(B ∩ E;B \ E)⟩. (3)
Proof. It is obvious that (3) is beliefs for a player, i.e., (3) is the event-causality
structure of beliefs and that it satisfies (C1).
To prove that (C2) is satisfied, suppose that there is an objective expression
s ∈ Ec ∩ (Cn(B′) \ (B′ ∪ CB′)). It contradicts (3).
Finally we prove that (C3) is satisfied. Now we suppose that another belief
structure B′′ = ⟨B′′, C(B′′)⟩ such that (B∪CB)\(B′′∪CB′′) ⊊ (B∪CB)\(B′∪CB′)
and Ec∩Cn(B′) = ∅. It implies that there is an objective expression p ∈ (B′′\B′)∩B
with p /∈ Ec ∩ Cn(B′′). Since B′ = B ∩ E, it implies p ∈ B \ E or p ∈ E \ B, in
contradiction. □
An expansion adds new propositions monotonously. An e-expansion inherits this
notion in the light of a player’s perceived experiences. Consider the same B,B′, and
E as Definition 4.2, then we define an e-expansion as follows:
Definition 4.4. B′ is an e-expansion from B and with E if and only if
(E1) B ⊆ B′;
(E2) (E ∪ C(E)) ⊆ Cn(B′).
While (E1) inherits the notion of the standard expansion, it guarantees that a
player does add the experienced propositions at most. Therefore, he does not add
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any non-experienced propositions such as subjective impressions and misunderstand-
ings. Note that it does not mean that he does not make mistakes because his memory
function may lead some mistakes. Here we just say that all the beliefs he holds are
derived from the event-causality structures. (E2) guarantees that all his experiences
are reflected in the e-expansion.
As the standard contraction and expansion, both e-contraction and e-expansion
are supposed that all the player’s experiences are consistent with his old beliefs.
Nevertheless he may face the facts inconsistent with his held beliefs. In the next,
we consider the revision with the perceived experiences, which leads new consistent
beliefs even when the experiences are inconsistent with the beliefs initially held by
a player.
4.2. Experience-based Revision. When a player faces an experience inconsistent
with his beliefs, there are usually several alternatives of the revision. For example,
suppose that he believes {¬q, p  q} and has an experience {p}. Then he might
change his belief to either {p,¬q}, {p, p q}, or {p}. However, if the player has no
reason to change his beliefs, it is reasonable to keep these beliefs. He should change
his beliefs only if he has some reason to change them.
Furthermore, if an alternative is no worse than another alternative on all dimen-
sions and better than it on some, then it is more reasonable to prefer the former.
That is, the player will follow the Pareto principle. Schulte [18] proposes the revi-
sion criterion based on the Pareto principle. If our theory simply applies Schulte’s
criterion for the revision with the perceived experiences, there are some problems
as stated below. Therefore we proposed another revision principle as an experience-
based consistent revision.
For the definition of the revision principle, we formally state the consistency.
We say that a player’s belief structure B is inconsistent if there is an objective
expression p ∈ B such that {p,¬p} ⊆ Cn(B) and that B is consistent if it is not
inconsistent. Now consider two belief structures B = ⟨B,CB⟩ and B′ = ⟨B′, CB′⟩,
and the perceived experiences E for a player, then we define an experience-based
consistent revision as follows:
Definition 4.5 (Revision with Experiences). B′ is an experience-based consistent
revision (or an e-revision) from B with E if and only if:
(R1) (E ∪ C(E)) ⊆ Cn(B′);
(R2) B′ is consistent;
(R3) If s ∈ B and s /∈ B′, then ¬s ∈ Cn(B′);
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(R4) There is no other belief state B′′ = ⟨B′′, CB′′⟩ such that B′′ satisﬁes (R1)–
(R3) and (B′′ ∪CB′′) △ (B ∪CB) ⊊ (B′ ∪CB′) △ (B ∪CB), where C △ D :=
C \D ∪D \ C.
In the deﬁnition, (R1) requires that the revised belief structure should reﬂect his
perceived experiences and (R2) guarantees that the belief is consistent. (R4) demon-
strates Schulte’s revision principle based on the Pareto principle, which requires the
minimal change for the e-revision. The notable diﬀerence is to employ (R3) follow-
ing Kraus and Lehmann [14]. (R3) says that, once a player believes a sequence in
his environment, he continues to believe it or denies it. By this requirement, the
player distinguishes the previously believed sequence from what he did not believe.
Namely the diﬀerence of his initial belief structure is revealed by the requirement
(R3). This is also the central diﬀerence with Schulte’s Pareto minimal consistent
change (See Schulte [18, p. 346]). The example in the next section will make this
point clear.
For a set F ⊆ A ∪N(A), we deﬁne the following two set:
M(F ) = {s ∈ F | the positive expression of s is a maximal sequence in F}, and
M(F ) = {s ∈ F | the positive expression of s is a minimal sequence in F}.
Now we characterize the e-revision with the perceived experiences in an info-
memory protocol. In the standard revision theory, the expression of the revision is
called Levi Identity when the revision is expressed by the contraction and expansion.
Therefore this following theorem is shown as our version of Levi identity.
Theorem 4.6 (Levi Identity). Suppose that σ¯ assigns σ¯(s) = ⊤ for all s ∈ B
of B = ⟨B,CB⟩. B′ = ⟨B′, CB′⟩ is an experience-based consistent revision from
B = ⟨B,CB⟩ with E = ⟨E,C(E)⟩ if and only if
B′ =
⟨
B ∩ E ∪
∪
s∈M(B\E)
{¬s} ∪M(E), CB \ C(B ∩ E;B \ E) ∪ C(E)
⟩
. (4)
This theorem states that his beliefs can be revised by the e-contraction for the non-
experienced propositions and by the e-expansion of both experiences and negation
of non-experienced maximal sequences.
There are two notable assertions in this theorem. The ﬁrst is that the addition of
the negations is not all members but the maximal sequences in B \E. As seen later
(Proposition 5.1), the consequence set Cn derives the negations of subsequences
for each maximal sequence. As it were, the player can reason the consequence
of subsequences. Then he does not need to add the negation of non-experienced
subsequences for the minimal revision.
17
61
Revision of Beliefs with Perceived Experiences
The second is related with the first assertion. The addition of the experienced
sequences is also the minimal sequences in E for the perceived experiences E. This
is also because of the consequences from the possibility connective. Since he believes
the possibility C(E), he can derive the supersequences of s ∈ E.
In the next section, we investigate a player’s personal view constructed by the
revised belief structure after the proof of the theorem.
4.3. Proof of Theorem 4.6. First we prove that B′ is an e-revision from B with
E if B′ is embodied as (4).
For (R1), s ∈ Cn(B′) for all s ∈ M(E) ⊆ E by (4). Since E is subsequence-
closed, (s  t) ∈ C(E) for each super sequence t of s ∈ M(E). It implies (s 
t) ∈ Cn(B′) for each s ∈ M(E) and each super sequence t ∈ E of s. Then, as
σ¯(s) = σ¯(s t) = ⊤, we have σ¯(t) = ⊤ for all the super sequence t of s. Hence we
obtain (E ∪ C(E)) ⊆ Cn(B′).
For (R2), suppose that B′ is inconsistent. Then there exists an atomic objective
expression s ∈ B′ such that {s,¬s} ⊆ Cn(B′). Then we have three cases; (i)
s,¬s ∈ B′, (ii) s ∈ B′ and ¬s ∈ Cn(B′) \B′, or ¬s ∈ B′ and s ∈ Cn(B′) \B′, and
(iii) s,¬s ∈ Cn(B′) \B′.
The first case implies that s is a member of a maximal non-experienced sequence
as in M(B \ E), in contradiction of (4). All the other cases imply that there is a
player’s belief assignment σ¯ such that σ¯(s) = σ¯(¬s) = ⊤, in contradiction of the
definition of the assignment. Then (R2) is satisfied.
For (R3), as s ∈ B and s /∈ B′, s is a member of B \E. If s is in M(B \E), (R3)
is immediately satisfied by (4). Otherwise, for each r ∈ (B \ E) \M(B \ E), there
is a super sequence s ∈ M(B \ E). As both r and s are also in B but not in B′,
(r  s) ∈ CB′). Hence, we obtain ¬r ∈ Cn(B′) because σ¯(¬s) = σ¯(r  s) = ⊤.
For (R4), suppose that there is another revised belief structure B′′ satisfying
(R1)–(R3) and (B′′∪CB′′) △ (B∪CB) ⊊ (B′∪CB′) △ (B∪CB) In the case that B′′
is added less than B′, B′′ breaks (4). The other case implies that the e-contraction
breaks (C3).
For the other direction, we suppose that B′ is an e-revision from B with E. As
the e-contraction guarantees a minimal contraction by (C3), we show that (4) in the
e-expansion is a minimal addition to B.
We consider three cases; (i) ¬s ∈ B′ for some s ∈M(B \E), (ii) s ∈ B′ for some
s ∈ M(E), and (iii) there is (s  t) ∈ C(E) such that (s  t) /∈ CB′ . The first
case apparently breaks (R3) and the second case breaks (R1) if there is a minimal
sequence s ∈ E with s /∈ B. The last case also breaks (R1) because (s t) /∈ Cn(B′)
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in the case that σ¯(s) = ⊤ for a subsequence s of t ∈ E with t /∈M(E). As a result,
if B′ is not the e-revision as (4), then B′ is not the e-expansion.
5. Comparisons with the Kaneko-Kline’s Personal View
By the above revision process, a player revises his initial belief structure referring
to his perceived experience structure. While the KK theory directly constructs the
player’s personal view by his memory function, we construct his view from his revised
belief structure in the light of the perceived experience. Our construction depends
on various the perceived experiences as well as the initial belief structure. Therefore
our theory reflects the personality of the players more. Furthermore, we show the
conditions of the coincidence with objective information protocols. Through this
section, we consider the e-revision of B′ from B with E in an objective info-memory
protocol ⟨Πo, pio,mo⟩.
5.1. Construction of a personal view. For a start, we study some basic proper-
ties of the revised belief structure. By the e-revision, a player obtains some additional
information and consequences by his reasoning. He constructs his personal view by
making use of the result of his e-revision.
As seen in the previous sections, the e-revision of his belief structure is achieved
with minimal change. Indeed the e-revision of the basic belief focuses on the minimal
sequences in ECi and the maximal sequences in Ei. This is because his reasoning
derives the consequence of the relative sequences shown as follows:
Proposition 5.1 (Conceivable Causality). Let B,B′ be two beliefs and E be ex-
periences for a player. Consider that B′ is an e-revision from B with E. For two
sequences s, t ∈ B such that s is a subsequence of t, if s /∈ B′ and ¬t ∈ B′, then
¬s ∈ Cn(B′).
Proof. Since s, t ∈ B and s is a subsequence of t and s /∈ B′, s t is a member
of both B and B′ by Theorem 4.6. Then, as ¬t and s  t is in Cn(B′), we have
¬s ∈ Cn(B′). □
This proposition says that, if a sequence t is a non-experiential belief and the
subsequence s of t is also non-experiential, then player i reasons that the subsequence
s cannot happen.
The result explicitly shows the central role of a player’s reasoning for economy of
the size of the belief change. Indeed, if this proposition is not shown, the player is
compelled to revise causality of all sequences and the subsequence of them.
In order to derive player i’s personal view from the revised belief structure B′i =
⟨B′i, CB′i⟩, we consider the following sets:
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• W i is the set of all information pieces occurring in Cn(B′i);
• Ai is the set of all available actions occurring in a sequence of Cn(B′i).
With the above sets, we deﬁne the player i’s personal view derived from the revised
belief structure B′i as follows:
Definition 5.2 (Personal View). Πi(B′i) is a personal information protocol for player
i derived from the belief structure B′i = ⟨B′i, CB′i⟩ such that
Πi(B′i) = (W
i, Ai,≺i,⊀i)
where ≺i= {s = ⟨ξ, w⟩| s ∈ Cn(B′i) ∩A} and ⊀i= {t = ⟨ξ, w⟩| ¬t ∈ Cn(B′i)}.
In contrast to the KK theory, our theory has a relation ⊀i. This represents i’s
belief that any sequence of ⊀i will not occur. While he builds his personal view by
≺i, he has the additional view based on ⊀i.
In the next example, we see the concrete construction of i’s personal view from B′i.
Moreover the example negatively answers the following two remarkable questions:
(i) Can the player derive the same personal view as the objective information
protocol?
(ii) Does all the player obtain the same revised belief structure under the same
initial belief or under the same experience?
The negative answers shows the natural results that it is diﬃcult to capture an ob-
jective world accurately and that each personal view depends on both each personal
belief and experiences.
Example 5.3. Let us reconsider the example of the Plato’s analogy of the cave in
the Introduction. That example is formally represented as the objective information
protocol Πo = (W o, Ao,≺o) where W o = {m,H,C, e}, Ao = {p}, and ≺o is all the
subsequences of the maximal sequence ⟨(m, p), (H, p), (C, p), e⟩ depicted in Figure 2.
Here p ∈ Ao means that time passes.
For the objective information protocol Πo, we give the objective player assignment
as pio(w) = {i} for any w ∈ W o and the following memory function of player i:
moi ⟨ξ, w⟩ =

{⟨w⟩} if w = m,H,C{
⟨(m, s), (H, p), (C, p), e⟩,
⟨(m, r), (C, p), (H, p), e⟩
}
if w = e.
(5)
In this example, we consider two diﬀerent initial belief structures B1,B2 dipicted
in Figures 8, 9. We give the basic belief B1i in B
1 as B1i = {t1, t2, t3, t4} and B2i in
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B2 as B2i = {t1, t2} where each maximal sequence is given as follows:
t1 = ⟨(m, p), (H, p), (H, p), e⟩,
t2 = ⟨(m, p), (H, p), (C, p), e⟩,
t3 = ⟨(m, p), (C, p), (H, p), e⟩,
t4 = ⟨(m, p), (C, p), (C, p), e⟩.
Furthermore consider the player’s experience Ei(Ξi) with Ξi = {e}. Then, for
the memory function (5) with Ξi = {e}, his basic experience Ei(Ξi) is all the subse-
quences of the maximal sequences ⟨(m, p), (H, p), (C, p), e⟩ and ⟨(m, p), (C, p), (H, p), e⟩.
We now look at the e-revisions from B1 and B2 with E.
When the player’s initial belief is B1, EC is the subsequences of t1 and t4 except
⟨m⟩ and ⟨e⟩. Then, Theorem 4.6 shows that he has ¬t1 and ¬t4. As E ⊆ B1, he
does not have any additional observations.
On the other hand, he has a diﬀerent revised belief in the case of B2 even for the
same perceived experieces. Indeed, EC is the subsequences of only t1 except ⟨m⟩
and ⟨e⟩. Hence, he has only ¬t1 and have an additional observation t3.
This consequence presents that the above questions are negative. Namely, a
player does not necessarily derive the same personal view as the objective informa-
tion protocol. Since the personal view depends on his memory function and the
accumulation, he may have some misunderstandings for the objective world. Even if
he has the more experiences, he may have an inaccurate personal view in comparison
with the objective information protocol.
In addition, even when the player has the same experiences, the revised belief
may be diﬀerent according to his initial belief structure. This is because of (R3) in
the e-revision and shows a natural situation that diﬀerent people can have diﬀerent
views. As the standard belief revision does not require (R3) for the minimal change
and regards the new information as important, there is no diﬀerence between the
initial beliefs in the standard theory (Consider the above cases without (R3)). Our
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theory can capture the diﬀerence of the players’ character as the diﬀerence of the
initial beliefs as well as that of the experiences.
5.2. Recoverability of the objective info-memory protocols. As seen in the
previous example, the player’s personal view does not necessarily coincide with the
objective information protocol. Then what conditions need for the coincidence on
earth? This subsection investigates the conditions.
For the coincidence with the objective information protocol, we ﬁrst study the
relation between the personal view Πi(B′) derived from B′ and the axioms in the
KK theory. This is because the both KK theory and our theory deﬁne objective
information protocol with the requirements of the axioms. Moreover the basic and
non basic axioms guarantee the correspondence to the Kuhn’s extensive-form games
by the KK theory. Now we introduce the following assumption on i’s experience
Ei(Ξi):
Terminal-recognition: For any ⟨ξ, w⟩ ∈ Ei(Ξi) with w /∈WEo (end pieces in
Πo), there is ⟨ξ′, w′⟩ ∈ Ei(Ξi) such that ⟨ξ′, w′⟩ is a supersequence of ⟨ξ, w⟩.
This condition states that, for each experience ⟨ξ, w⟩ of player i, he has another
experience ⟨ξ′, w′⟩ including ⟨ξ, w⟩ if ⟨ξ, w⟩ is not a terminal in theobjective infor-
mation protocol. That is, he can recognize the terminal in the objective situation. It
is a substitution in our theory for action-closedness in Kaneko and Kline [13, p. 19].
Then the personal information protocol guarantees the basic axioms as follows:
Proposition 5.4 (Preservation of Axioms). For player i’s belief structure B′,
(i) Πi(B′) satisfies Axioms B1, B2, and B3;
(ii) Πi(B′) satisfies Axiom B4 under the terminal-recognition.
Proof. (i) Πi(B′) satisﬁes Axiom B1 by the deﬁnition.
For Axiom B2, consider a ∈ Ai. Then there is a feasible sequence (s, a) ≺i t for
some s, t ∈W i or (u, a) ⊀i v for some u, v ∈W i by the deﬁnition.
For Axiom B3, recall that the basic belief Bi of the initial belief structure B and
Ei(Ξi) for any Ξi ⊆ Ξo are subsequence-closed by the deﬁnitions. Moreover, for any
maximal sequence t in ∈ B′i of B′, (a) t ∈ Cn(B′) or (b) ¬t ∈ Cn(B′). In the case
(a), for any subsequence s of t, s ≺i t because of the subsequence-closedness of Bi
and Ei(Ξi). In (b), if ¬t ∈ Cn(B′), then t ∈ M(B \ E). If a subsequence s is in
Ei(Ξi), then s ∈≺i. Otherwise s ∈⊀i because of Proposition 5.1. Therefore Πi(B′)
satisﬁes Axiom B3.
(ii) Axiom 4 is immediately obtained from the terminal-recognition. □
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The above proposition shows that the constructed personal view in our theory
is connected with the objective information protocol required in the KK theory.
With this result, we investigate the possibility of the coincidence with the objective
information protocol by specifying memory functions.
For player i’s position ⟨ξ, w⟩ = ⟨(w1, a1), . . . , (wm, am), w⟩ ∈ Ξi, ⟨ξ, w⟩i is de-
ﬁned as the subsequence of ⟨ξ, w⟩ consisting only of i’s information piece wt ∈ W i.
Following Kaneko and Kline [12, pp. 19–20], we provide i’s memory functions in
(Πo, pio,mo) as follows:
• mPIi is called the m-perfect-information memory function if
mPIi ⟨ξ, w⟩ = {⟨ξ, w⟩} for ⟨ξ, w⟩ ∈ Ξi;
• mPRi is called the m-perfect-recall memory function if
mPRi ⟨ξ, w⟩ = {⟨ξ, w⟩i} for ⟨ξ, w⟩ ∈ Ξi;
• mCi is called the classical memory function if
mCi ⟨ξ, w⟩ = {⟨η, v⟩| ⟨η, v⟩ ∈ Ξ and v = w} for ⟨ξ, w⟩ ∈ Ξi.
The m-perfect-information memory function is a memory function that player i
remembers all knots that he passes by at each of his positions. Whereas the m-
perfect-recall function is a function he remembers all knots where he decided at
each of his positions. Therefore he does not remember the knots of his opponents.
The classical memory function gives all the histories of his position from the root
although the player cannot specify the exact position if several positions have the
same tail.
Both the m-perfect-information and classical memory functions will remind the
reader of some concepts in the standard game theory such as perfect information
games and perfect recall. Indeed we can see the common properties seen in the
standard extensive-form games. For instance, the following fact indicates that these
two memory functions bring the same situation as the standard one to the players.
Fact 5.5. [Minimal Experiences] Given i’s perceived experience structure E with
either class of the above three memory functions, the basic experience Ei(Ξi) satisﬁes
the terminal recognition if Ξi = Ξ
Eo
i where Ξ
Eo
i = {⟨ξ, w⟩ ∈ Ξoi | w ∈ WEo }.
This fact shows that the players can recall a suﬃcient history only by the ac-
cumulation of his maximal position. Considering that each of memory functions
corresponds to perfect information and perfect recall in the standard one, the as-
sumptions of the extensive-form games imply that the players are given the suﬃcient
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information or memories. That is, the players in the games suppose the hypothet-
ical end of the game and they just make decisions of complete contingent plans.
Hence we consider the recoverability of an objective situation. Now we deﬁne the
recoverability as follows:
Definition 5.6. The i’s personal information protocol Πi(B′) recovers the objective
information protocol Πo = (W o, Ao,≺o) if and only if ≺i=≺o.
Then we have a result of the recoverability by the classical memory functions. In
addition the recoverability is possible by m-perfect information functions show as
the corollary of the classical memory functions as the m-perfect-information memory
function is a special case of the classical memory function.:
Proposition 5.7. Suppose that moi = m
C
i . Then the personal information protocol
Πi(B′) coincides with the objective information protocol Πo if and only if Ξi = ΞEoi
Proof. By Fact 5.5, ∪
⟨ξ,w⟩∈Ξi
mCi ⟨ξ, w⟩ =
∪
⟨ξ,w⟩∈ΞEoi
mCi ⟨ξ, w⟩.
Then Ei(Ξi) = Ei(Ξ
Eo
i ) =≺o. Hence we have ≺o⊆ Cn(B′) by Theorem 4.6. If there
is a p ∈ Cn(B′)\ ≺i, then p ∈ Cn(B′) ∩N(A). Therefore we have ≺i=≺o. □
Corollary 5.8. Suppose that moi = m
PI
i . Then the personal information protocol
Πi(B′) coincides with the objective information protocol Πo if and only if Ξi = ΞEoi .
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates a player’s dynamic process to revise and construct his
personal view. Our theory presents a general framework to describe the situation
that the players look at their environment in diﬀerent ways. We state the relation
with the standard revision theory and give some comments on the further research
of our theory below.
As stated in the Introduction, our inductive derivation is a diﬀerent approach from
the literature of the learning models. Moreover, while making use of the framework
of the KK theory, our theory focuses on the permanent revision process based on
the player’s experiences. The treatment of the experiences in out theory is a slight
diﬀerent from the standard belief revision theory.
Belief revision theory has developed in philosophy and computer science in or-
der to inquire how people change their beliefs and knowledge or how databases in
computers should be changed. Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson [1] (so-called
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AGM theory) made a major breakthrough in this literature. The AGM theory pro-
vides a set of axioms to be satisﬁed for a belief revision to be reasonable. In the
theory, the whole belief that the player holds consists of a basic belief and the con-
sequence of it. The revision in the AGM theory is simultaneously revised without
any distinction between the basic belief and the consequence of it.
In contrast to the AGM theory, our theory distinguishes between what a player
originally believes and what he logically derives from the original belief such as the
basic event set and the causality set or consequence set. This is based on our motiva-
tion that the players are not simple a database but have some logical abilities. This
approach is close to the belief base theory, which distinguishes between the belief
base and the consequence.5 However the theory of the belief base focuses neither on
the new observations as the experiences in our theory nor on the accumulation of
them. Our theory combines two parts, the use of accumulated observations and the
logical derivations from them, for decision-making.
Recently Board [2] provides a formal dynamic model of interactive reasoning in
order to investigate players’ beliefs and belief revision in extensive-form games. How-
ever, the standard game theory supposes that all the players know their environment
suﬃciently and look at the same one. Therefore the players reason their actions
based on the knowledge of the environment. In contrast to the approach, our theory
investigates the formation of players’ view of their environment. The players are
allowed to have diﬀerent views on the identical environment.
As this paper aims the provision of a general framework of the revision with the
experiences, there remain several studies to be done. In the further research, we
investigate (i) how the players with diﬀerent views make decisions in our theory
(ii) where the various players’ views are going after the repetitive revision. In the
standard game theory, the players face the identical situation and know that even
when considering incomplete information games. Our theory is a start to inquire that
it is possible to achieve and to analyze misunderstandings pointed by Kaneko [10]
and Kaneko and Kline [11]. In the society that people do not necessarily recognize
identical environments, how do they harmonize with each other? This is the fount
to pursue in our research.
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